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Finishing Off Forced Fatherhood: Does It
Really Matter if Blood or DNA Evidence
Can Rebut the Presumption of Paternity?
Jacinta M. Testa*
I. Introduction
A party seeking to challenge the paternity of a child born during
wedlock faces a rather onerous task.' In Pennsylvania, courts have
applied the doctrine of the presumption of paternity in cases in which the
paternity of a child born during wedlock is challenged.2  The
presumption of paternity is a theory of law that presumes that a woman's
husband is the father of her child.3
The presumption of paternity is inequitable and unrealistic from a
logical standpoint. Because its application forbids the use of blood and
DNA evidence to determine paternity without first overcoming the
presumption, the presumption of paternity ignores reality in exchange for
recognizing ancient common law. Even if the presumption of paternity
is not applied, the Pennsylvania courts tend to apply the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel to achieve similar results.4
Many have criticized the presumption of paternity and the doctrine
of paternity by estoppel because of the inequitable results.5 Chief Justice
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2004.
1. See infra notes 25-46 and accompanying text.
2. See, e.g., Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1999) (addressing and discussing the
doctrine of the presumption of paternity); Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999)
(addressing and discussing the doctrine of the presumption of paternity); Miscovich v.
Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), affd, 720 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1998) (applying
the doctrine of the presumption of paternity).
3. See Fish, 741 A.2d at 721; Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1052; Miscovich, 688 A.2d at
726.
4. See Fish, 741 A.2d at 721 (applying the doctrine of paternity by estoppel in a
strict manner to hold a husband responsible for the child born during his marriage to his
wife, but actually fathered by another man).
5. See, e.g., Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997) (Nigro, J. and Newman, J.,
dissenting); Alex Tresniowski et al., Dads By Default, PEOPLE MAG., Nov. 25, 2002, at
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Flaherty of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that the doctrines
create a legal fiction:
The presumption of paternity and the doctrine of estoppel, therefore,
embody the two great fictions of the law of paternity that regardless
of biology, the married people to whom the child was born are the
parents; and the doctrine of estoppel embodies the fiction that,
regardless of biology, in the absence of a marriage, the person who
cared for the child is the parent.
6
The impact of the "two great fictions of the law of paternity ' 7 is felt
beyond the courtroom. In past cases, the presumption of paternity and
the doctrine of paternity by estoppel supported a deceitful and unfaithful
wife's misrepresentation to her husband by legally determining the
husband to be the father of a child conceived during an extramarital
affair.
Imagine the following hypothetical.8  Husband and wife are
married; wife becomes pregnant and gives birth to a child. But, during
the marriage and at the time of conception, wife engages in an
extramarital affair. Wife fails to inform husband of the affair and the
possibility that he may not be the father of the child. After some time
has passed, husband discovers wife's indiscretions and the parties
separate. Husband now suspects that he is not the biological father of the
child and wants proof of the paternity of the child. Husband and child
submit to blood tests that exclude husband as the father of the child.
Husband refuses to pay support. Logically it seems that the husband
should not be liable for the child's support. But, the court will analyze,
in some way, the legal doctrines of the presumption of paternity and
paternity by estoppel. Consequently, it is possible that the husband will
be held legally responsible for his wife's child.
In the late 1990s, the above hypothetical was reality for at least two
ex-husbands. Two Pennsylvania Superior Court decisions found ex-
husbands to be the legal father of their adulterous wives' children by
applying the presumption of paternity. 9 These examples demonstrate the
courts' struggle with the presumption of paternity and paternity by
estoppel. Some courts appear to have misapplied and misunderstood the
78 (discussing the problems associated with the doctrine of the presumption of paternity
across the nation).
6. Id. at 180. Although Chief Justice Flaherty recognized that the doctrines create a
legal fiction, he still appeared to support the use of the doctrines of the presumption of
paternity and paternity by estoppel. Id.
7. Id.
8. See Tresniowski et al., supra note 5.
9. Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Miscovich v. Miscovich,
688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), affTd, 720 A.2d 764 (Pa. 1998).
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presumption of paternity and under-analyzed the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel. It was not until 1999 that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
brought some clarity to the issue.'
0
Further, in the past five years several members of the Pennsylvania
General Assembly reacted to the injustice associated with both the
presumption of paternity and the doctrine of paternity by estoppel and to
the several pivotal Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in the late
1990s. The Pennsylvania legislature has looked at several different
proposed bills that would affect the presumption of paternity and the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel."
The purpose of this Comment is to discuss the harm associated with
the Pennsylvania courts' past problematic definition and application of
the presumption of paternity and the doctrine of paternity by estoppel.
Second, this Comment will discuss how the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decision in Fish v. Behers changed the way courts apply the presumption
of paternity. Further, this Comment will address the issues associated
with the Pennsylvania courts' reluctance to allow the admission of blood
and DNA evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity. Finally, this
Comment will analyze how legislation could affect the court's treatment
and application of the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel.
Section II of this Comment will provide the historical development
of the presumption of paternity and the doctrine of paternity by estoppel
in Pennsylvania law. Section III will provide the more recent
developments in the law of the presumption of paternity. Section IV will
discuss the impact of the recent developments in the law. Section V will
discuss how the proposed legislation is no longer needed because the
most egregious of the inequities caused by the presumption of paternity
and paternity by estoppel have been eliminated.
II. Background: Historic Development of the Presumption of
Paternity
A. The Origin of the Presumption of Paternity
The presumption of paternity has been characterized as one of the
10. See Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1999).
11. See H.R. 2701, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001) (proposed bill in
Pennsylvania House of Representatives in 2001); S. 802, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Pa. 2001) (proposed bill in the Pennsylvania Senate in 2001); H.R. 521, 185th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (proposed bill in Pennsylvania House of Representatives in
1999); H.R. 522, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (proposed bill in
Pennsylvania House of Representatives); H.R. 523, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa.
1999) (proposed bill in Pennsylvania House of Representatives); S. 516, 184th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999) (proposed bill in Pennsylvania Senate in 1999).
2004) 1297
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strongest presumptions known in the law. 12 It is a legal theory that
presumes "that a child born to a married woman is the child of the
woman's husband."' 3  Traditionally, the methods of rebutting the
presumption of paternity were extremely limited: "the presumption could
be rebutted only by proof either that the husband was physically
incapable of fathering a child or that he did not have access to his wife
during the period of conception."
' 14
The legal theory of the presumption of paternity originated at
common law.1 5  The presumption of paternity originated as the
presumption of legitimacy.' 6  The presumption of legitimacy was a
mechanism to legitimize children in order to avoid "bastardization."'
' 7
As recognized by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, "the status
'illegitimate' historically subjected a child so labelled [sic] to significant
legal and social discrimination."' 18 Until 1971 in Pennsylvania, any child
born out of wedlock was considered "illegitimate."'1 9  In 1971,
Pennsylvania eliminated the categories of "legitimate" and "illegitimate"
children.20 The Pennsylvania legislature enacted legislation that stated
that all children, whether born in wedlock or out of wedlock, will be
treated as if they were born to married parents.2 '
In 1990, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abandoned the language
of "presumption of legitimacy. 22 The court began using the language
"the presumption that a child born to a married woman is the child of the
12. See Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1053-54 (Pa. 1999) (stating that the
"presumption at issue-that a child born to a married woman is the child of the woman's
husband-has been one of the strongest presumptions known to the law"); see also John
M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1990) (stating that the presumption of paternity
is extremely strong); Cairgle v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 77 A.2d 439,
442 (Pa. 1951) (stating in majority opinion that "presumption of legitimacy is, however,
still one of the strongest known to law").
13. Strauser, 726 A.2d at 1053.
14. Id. at 1054.
15. Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 286 (Pa. 1814).
16. Cairgle, 77 A.2d at 442.
17. See John M., 571 A.2d at 1384 n.2 ("The 'presumption of legitimacy' arose from
the reluctance in the law to declare a child 'illegitimate' because the status 'illegitimate'




20. See id. (discussing the historical development of the language used in regard to
the presumption of paternity); see also 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102 (2002) ("all children
shall be legitimate irrespective of the marital status of their parents, and, in every case
where children are born out of wedlock, they shall enjoy all the rights and privileges as if
they had been born during the wedlock of their parents.").
21. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5102 (2002) (declaring all children born in Pennsylvania to
be legitimate).
22. John M., 571 A.2d at 1384 n.2.
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marriage.',23 Thereafter, the phrase "the presumption of paternity"
emerged as the common term used.24
Traditionally, the presumption that the child of a married woman
was her husband's child was very difficult to overcome.25 One of the
first cases the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided on this issue only
allowed a husband to rebut the presumption of paternity by proving non-
access.26  "Non-access" was established by proving either a great
physical distance between the husband and wife or the husband's
sterility.
27
Subsequent cases relaxed the original restrictions on the ability of a
husband to rebut the presumption of the paternity of his wife's child, but
a husband still faced an uphill battle.28 Specifically, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court relaxed its understanding of the requirements for proving
non-access. 29  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania interpreted a
husband's non-access to his wife as the lack of ability or opportunity to
engage in sexual intercourse with his wife.30  Yet, non-access was
difficult to prove because neither the wife nor the husband could testify
to non-access.3
Moreover, the presumption of paternity is difficult to overcome
because the presumption may be rebutted only by evidence that is "clear,
direct, convincing, and unanswerable. 32  The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has also held that the presumption of legitimacy is irrebuttable
when a third party, most often a "putative father," seeks to challenge the
paternity of a child born during wedlock.33
The Pennsylvania courts supported the presumption of legitimacy
not only to avoid possible bastardization of children, but also because
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1999) (using the phrase
"presumption of paternity" in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court); Brinkley v. King, 701
A.2d 176 (Pa. 1997) (using the phrase "presumption of paternity" in the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court).
25. Commonwealth v. Shepherd, 6 Binn. 283, 286 (Pa. 1814).
26. Id. at 286-87.
27. Id.
28. See Dennison v. Page, 29 Pa. 420 (1857) (interpreting non-access as lack of
ability or opportunity to engage in sexual relations); see also Cairgle v. Am. Radiator &
Standard Sanitary Corp., 77 A.2d 439 (Pa. 1951) (recognizing definition of non-access
used in Dennison, but also stating that neither husband nor wife could testify to non-
access, making it almost impossible to prove).
29. Dennison, 29 Pa. at 423.
30. Id.
3 1. Id. The courts have said that "neither the mother nor the father can bastardize it
[a child born during marriage] by testifying to non-access." Cairgle, 77 A.2d at 442.
32. Dennison, 29 Pa. at 423. However, the court did state that "it is not necessary
that the possibility of access be completely excluded." Id.
33. Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1054-56 (Pa. 1999).
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they desired to preserve the family unit.34 The courts have stated that the
presumption of paternity "is essential in any society in which the family
is the fundamental unit and were [sic] founded in good morals and public
decency."
35
B. The Effect of the Widespread Use and Acceptance of Scientific
Blood Tests on the Presumption of Paternity
The strength of the presumption of paternity in Pennsylvania law
and the advancement of science and modern technology, specifically the
developments in the arena of genetic testing, create an unusual tension in
the law. In recent years, blood testing has become more and more
accurate and is alleged to prove paternity, in most cases, by over 98%.36
A Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice stated that "the presumption of
paternity embodies the fiction that regardless of biology, the married
people to whom the child are born are the parents. 37 Therefore, the
presumption of paternity may delegate the role of father to one man,
although fatherhood has been scientifically proven otherwise.38
Science and technology have played major roles in the ongoing saga
of the law of the presumption of paternity in Pennsylvania. In 1961,
Pennsylvania enacted the Uniform Act on Blood Tests To Determine
Paternity ("UABT").39 Section Five of the UABT states that blood
grouping tests may be ordered by the court "[i]n a civil action in which
the paternity parentage or identity of a child is a relevant fact., 40 It also
provides that "[t]he presumption of legitimacy of a child born during
wedlock is overcome if the court finds that the conclusions of all the
experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the
husband is not the father of the child.
41
The plain language of the UABT appeared to allow a party to use
34. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351, 354-55 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1962).
35. Id. (citing Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v. O'Brien, 390 Pa. 551, 556 (1957).
36. See, e.g., Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 185-86 (Pa. 1997); see also
Christopher L. Blakesley, Scientific Testing and Proof of Paternity: Some Controversy
and Key Issues for Family Law Counsel, 57 LA. L. REv. 379 (1997) (discussing the
impact of blood and tissue testing on paternity cases).
37. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 180.
38. See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (concluding that husband
is the father of the child, although not the biological father); Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688
A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (determining ex-husband father for legal purposes, even
though blood tests proved he was not the biological father and evidence was presented
that he was fooled into believing he was the biological father of the child by his ex-wife).
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blood evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity.42 The first
Pennsylvania judicial interpretation embraced the plain meaning of the
text of the statute.43 In Commonwealth ex rel Goldman v. Goldman, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court allowed a party to use the results of a blood
test to rebut the presumption of paternity in place of providing clear
evidence of non-access or infertility.44 The Pennsylvania Superior Court
reasoned that the presumption of legitimacy was rebuttable prior to the
enactment of the UABT, and the legislature had just added another
method of rebutting the presumption.45  Yet, in cases following
Goldman, the Pennsylvania courts interpreted the statute in a manner
almost completely contrary to the plain meaning.46
III. Recent Developments in the Law of the Presumption of Paternity
and Paternity by Estoppel
A. The Ongoing Interpretation of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests To
Determine Paternity in the Pennsylvania Courts and the Courts'
Troubled Application of the Presumption ofPaternity
Goldman is not the law in Pennsylvania.47 In 1990, in John M. v.
Paula T., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that a third-party alleged
biological father could not force a husband to submit to blood testing to
determine paternity.48 In 1997, a divided court decided Brinkley v.
King.49 In Brinkley, the court allowed the use of blood evidence to
determine paternity only because it had concluded that the presumption
of paternity was inapplicable.50
In John M v. Paula T., a husband and wife were married and
raising four children. 51 The plaintiff-appellee was wife's intimate partner
42. Id.
43. Commonwealth ex rel. Goldman v. Goldman, 184 A.2d 351 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1962).
44. Id. at 354.
45. Id. at 354.
46. See id. at 351 (allowing blood evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity
under the Uniform Act on Blood Tests); see also Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176 (Pa.
1997) (holding that blood evidence is allowed because the parties were no longer
married); Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993) (allowing blood evidence to
determine paternity, but only after the presumption of paternity was rebutted by other
means); John M. v. Paula T., 571 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1990) (holding that a third party may
not force the presumptive father to submit to blood tests to determine paternity).
47. See cases cited supra note 46.
48. 571 A.2dat 1380.
49. 701 A.2d at 176.
50. Id. Yet, in the plurality opinion, two justices argued to expand the means
available to rebut the presumption of paternity to include the results of a blood test.
51. 571 A.2d at 1381.
2004]
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prior to her marriage to husband, but the relationship resumed for a time
during wife's marriage to husband.52 Based upon this relationship,
appellee, the alleged biological father, sought custody of Paula T.'s
second child and wanted Paula T.'s husband to have a blood test to
determine the paternity of the child.53
The Pennsylvania Superior Court granted the appellee's motion, but
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the decision.54 The court
applied the presumption of paternity and asserted that, although the
UABT "relaxed" the presumption somewhat, its enactment did not
overcome the policy underlying the presumption of paternity, which is to
protect the family.55 The court ruled that the UABT did not "relax the
presumption to the extent that a 'putative father,' a third party who
stands outside the marital relationship and attempts to establish paternity
over a child to the marriage, may compel the 'presumptive father,' the
husband, to submit to blood tests.,
56
After a confusing and unclear decision by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court in 1993, 57 the court again took up the issue in 1997.58 In
Brinkley v. King, a family dissolved after the husband's discovery of his
wife's infidelity and resulting pregnancy. 59 After the wife's divorce, she
filed an action for child support against King, the wife's intimate partner
and the alleged biological father of the child. 60 King claimed that
Brinkley was precluded from challenging the paternity of the child.6'
King argued that because the child was conceived while Brinkley was
married to her ex-husband, the presumption of paternity applied and had
not been successfully rebutted.62
The Pennsylvania Superior Court applied the presumption of
paternity, thereby concluding that Brinkley's ex-husband was the legal
father of the child.63 Two of three judges on the panel suggested that the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court review the case to evaluate the function of
the presumption of paternity.64  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1382, 1388.
55. Id. at 1384-85.
56. Id. at 1384-85.
57. See Jones v. Trojak, 634 A.2d 201 (Pa. 1993). Although the court addressed the
issues regarding the use of blood testing to rebut the presumption of paternity, a clear cut
methodology regarding the decision was not found.
58. Brinkley, 701 A.2d at 176.
59. Id. at 177-78.
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granted allocotur and vacated the Superior Court's decision. 65 The court
held that the presumption of paternity was inapplicable because Brinkley
and her ex-husband were no longer married; thus there was no intact
family to protect.66 The court reasoned that, although the presumption of
paternity applies when a child is conceived or born during marriage, it
does not always apply unless "the policies which underlie the
presumption ... would be advanced by its application. 67
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, although it did not include the
analysis in the opinion, affirmed that blood or DNA evidence was not
admissible to rebut the presumption of paternity.68 In a footnote, the
court stated that it "decline[d] to accept Superior Court's suggestion that
we expand the ways in which one can rebut the presumption of
paternity... [t]he presumption of paternity continues to be rebutted, if at
all, by evidence related to biology: there was no access or the
presumptive father was incapable of procreation.'
69
The actual precedential value of Brinkley v. King was unclear
because it was only a plurality opinion.7 ° In looking at the opinion
announcing the judgment of the court, it is clear that at least four of the
Justices agreed on the outcome of the case, but disagreed as to why the
outcome was appropriate.7'
B. The Problematic Application of the Presumption of Paternity and
the Resulting Inequities
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's initial attempts at clarifying the
presumption of paternity set the stage for at least two ex-husbands to be
held liable for the children of their deceitful wives. 72  The plurality
opinion in Brinkley led to uneven treatment of the presumption of
paternity by the Pennsylvania Superior Court.73 In addition to refusing to
allow blood or DNA evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity, the
65. Id. at 178, 181.
66. Id. at 181.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 181 n.9.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 181.
71. Id. at 177-81, 181-82, 182-90.
72. See Amrhein v. Cozad, 714 A.2d 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Misocovich v.
Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997).
73. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 181 (Pa. 1997) (reasoning that if the parties
are no longer married, the policy of preserving the family would not be served by
applying the presumption of paternity); Amrhein, 714 A.2d at 409 (holding that the
presumption of paternity is applicable where the child was born to an intact family, even
if the parties were no longer married).
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court in Brinkley did not explicitly define the proper application of the
presumption of paternity. This lack of explicit definition left a gap in the
law that allowed the presumption of paternity to be applied in an
inequitable fashion.
In the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions of the late 1990s, the
court applied the presumption of paternity to force fatherhood on duped
ex-husbands.74  The most notable recent case is Miscovich v.
Miscovich.75 Miscovich provoked great interest in the doctrine of the
presumption of paternity because the outcome appeared so unjust.
76
Gerald Miscovich, the challenging party, was deceived into
believing he was the father of his wife's child and was legally held to be
responsible for the child.77 Gerald never questioned the paternity of the
couple's child until two years after the divorce when, as pointed out by
his new wife, he discovered that it was a genetic improbability for a child
born to him and his ex-wife to have brown eyes.78 Subsequent blood
testing excluded Gerald as the child's father.79
Gerald confronted his ex-wife with the blood test results, and she
filed a support action against the alleged biological father, but the trial
court applied the presumption of paternity and found that the
presumption had not been rebutted.80 Gerald appealed the trial court's
decision, arguing that the presumption of paternity should not apply
because there is no longer an intact family to preserve, and the UABT
commanded the court to admit blood evidence. 8'
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the
presumption of paternity was properly applied and was not overcome.82
The court held that blood or DNA evidence was not admissible to rebut
the presumption of paternity.83 The court reasoned that blood or DNA
evidence was only admissible to determine paternity once the
presumption of paternity is successfully overcome by one of the
traditional means.84
The Pennsylvania Superior Court decision in Amrhein v. Cozad
further demonstrates how prior applications of the presumption of
74. See supra note 72.
75. 688 A.2d at 726.
76. Danielle N. Rodier, Proposed Bill Could Abolish Presumption of Paternity, PA.
L. WKLY., Mar. 15, 1999, at 1, 27.
77. Miscovich, 688 A.2d at 727.
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paternity produced absurd results. 85 A panel of the Superior Court,
sitting in Pittsburgh, applied the presumption of paternity in a situation
where wife and ex-husband were already separated.86
In Amrhein, both the wife and ex-husband had engaged in extra-
martial affairs. 87 When the wife became pregnant, she thought it unlikely
that her husband had fathered the child because she believed that the
couple was incapable of conceiving.88 At the wife's request, paternity
testing was performed, and it revealed that her ex-husband could not be
the child's father. 89 The parties subsequently separated, and the wife
brought a child support claim against her intimate partner, the child's
alleged biological father.
90
The lower court denied the wife's claim against the alleged
biological father and entered an order requiring the ex-husband to pay
child support.91 The ex-husband appealed the lower court's order, but
the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the holding.92 The court
applied the presumption of paternity because the child had been born
while the wife and ex-husband were still living as a married couple and
concluded that it had not been rebutted by one of the traditional means.93
The court reasoned that the presumption of paternity is applicable as long
as the family was intact at the time of birth.94
The court further reasoned that applying the presumption of
paternity only when the parties were still married would defeat the policy
underlying the presumption of paternity and the doctrine of paternity by
estoppel. 95 The court reasoned that not applying the presumption of
paternity when the parties were divorced or separated would encourage
independent paternity determinations and result in separation of the
couple.96 Therefore, the protection of the family unit would be
ineffective because many parties would separate after receiving results
from independent paternity determinations.
Moreover, the court did not allow the use of blood evidence to rebut
the presumption of paternity.97 The court did not interpret Brinkley to
85. 714 A.2dat 409.
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allow the use of blood evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity.98
The court reasoned that if it allowed the use of blood evidence, the
underlying purpose and policy for the presumption of paternity would be
overcome.
99
Hence, the court held a soon-to-be ex-husband liable for the support
of a child conceived by his wife while she was engaged in an
extramarital affair, which was unknown to him until a year after the
child's birth.100 The ex-husband, once he was informed of the truth, left
his wife and the family was no longer intact.10' The application of the
presumption of paternity in Amrhein did nothing more than legally
require an unsuspecting husband to care for his adulterous wife's child.
C. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Affirms the Importance of the
Presumption of Paternity but Significantly Alters Its Application
The late 1990s was filled with conflict regarding the presumption of
paternity. The issue of whether or not to allow blood and/or DNA
evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity was debated. Several
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justices expressed distaste for both the
presumption of paternity and the doctrine of paternity by estoppel.1
0 2
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions in John M. and Brinkley, and
the Superior Court decisions that followed, muddied the waters and
created some problematic results. Ultimately, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court appeared prepared to discard the presumption of paternity in late
1999.103
In Fish v. Behers, a child was born to Ruth Fish during her marriage
to David Fish.10 4 Unbeknownst to Ruth Fish's husband, the pregnancy
resulted from an extramarital affair with Robert Behers, Jr.10 5  Ruth
informed Behers that he was the father.' 0 6 The child was born in 1989,
and Ruth did not reveal to her husband that he was not the father of the
98. Id. at412-13.
99. Id. at 411.
100. See id. at 409-11.
101. Id. at 410.
102. See, e.g., Strauser v. Stahr, 726 A.2d 1052, 1056-58 (Pa. 1999) (Nigro, J. and
Newman, J., dissenting); Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 724-25 (Pa. 1999) (Nigro, J. and
Newman, J. dissenting).
103. Fish, 741 A.2d at 721; see also Julie A. Auerbach, In Fish v. Behers,
Pennsylvania High Court All But Eliminates Presumption of Husband's Paternity, L.
INTELLIGENCER, Jan. 26, 2000, at 7.
104. Fish, 741 A.2d at 722.
105. Id.
106. Id. Ruth initially wanted to have an abortion, but decided otherwise after
speaking with Behers. Id.
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child. 10 7 Although her husband did question the child's paternity on
several occasions, he accepted the child as his own.
10
8
Ruth revealed to her husband in 1992 that he was not the biological
father of the child. 0 9  After paternity testing confirmed Ruth's
admission, David Fish filed for divorce. 10 Upon divorce, the parties
agreed that David Fish would support his two children of the marriage,
but not Ruth's son conceived during an extramarital affair."' In 1994,
Ruth filed an action for child support against Behers. 12 The trial court
allowed the action to move forward, but the Superior Court reversed the
trial court's decision and ruled that Ruth was estopped from challenging
the child's paternity.13 The court did not address the issue of whether
blood or DNA evidence was admissible to rebut the presumption of
paternity. 114
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately decided the case in
December 1999."5 The court held that the presumption of paternity was
inapplicable because, due to the parties' separation and subsequent
divorce, there was no longer an intact family to protect. 16 Yet, the court
dismissed Ruth's action by ruling that Ruth was estopped from
challenging her child's paternity because of David Fish's ongoing
treatment of the child as his own." 7 The court applied the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel to hold Ruth estopped from challenging the child's
paternity.18
The decision in Fish had a strong dissent.' 9 Justice Nigro and
Justice Newman reiterated their arguments against the presumption of
paternity set forth in prior decisions. 20 The justices also argued against
the strict application of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel in cases such
as Fish.'2 The dissent addressed the inequities created by the court's












118. Id. at 724-25. See also infra text accompanying notes 132-47 (discussing theory
of paternity by estoppel).
119. Id. (Newman, J. and Nigro, J., dissenting).
120. Id. at 724.
121. Id.
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Fish was not the child's biological father. 122 The dissenting Justices
argued that the trial court should be given discretion in these types of
situations and the doctrine of estoppel should not be strictly applied.
123
The dissenting justices advocated that the trial court should have
"the discretion to order paternity tests and then consider such evidence
along with other factors relevant to making a decision in the best
interests of the child.' ' 124  The dissenters rationalized that such an
approach would not only prevent the "duped father" from being saddled
with the legal responsibilities for a child that is not his, but would also
prevent a biological father from avoiding his legal responsibilities to a
child he fathered.
125
D. The Interplay of the Presumption of Paternity and Paternity by
Estoppel
Successfully rebutting the presumption of paternity is difficult and
rare. 126  Successfully arguing that the presumption of paternity is
inapplicable in a present situation could be just as difficult. 127 Yet, if a
successful challenge is made on either ground, the party challenging the
paternity of a child may still face a hurdle if the court strictly applies the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel. 1
28
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated that "the legal
identification of a father... even in a case involving the presumption of
paternity, may also involve the question of estoppel.' 29 In applying the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel, one or both of the parties may be
estopped from challenging the child's paternity because he or she acted
as the child's parent.
130
122. Id. at 724-25.
123. Id. at 725.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See supra notes 25-46 and accompanying text (discussing the methods available
to rebut the presumption of paternity and how the methods have evolved somewhat over
time).
127. See generally supra Part III.C (discussing the application of the presumption of
paternity in recent cases in Pennsylvania).
128. See supra Part III.C (discussing recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court case in
which the presumption of paternity was deemed inapplicable, but the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel was applied); see generally Heather Faust, Comment, Challenging
the Paternity of Children Born During Wedlock: An Analysis of Pennsylvania Law
Regarding the Effects of the Doctrines of the Presumption of Legitimacy and Paternity by
Estoppel on the Admissibility of Blood Tests To Determine Paternity, 100 DICK. L. REv.
963 (1996) (discussing problems caused by presumption of paternity and the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel, specifically in light of the inability of parties to rebut the
presumption of paternity using blood evidence).
129. Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 179 (Pa. 1997).
130. Id. at 179-80.
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Paternity by estoppel is "merely a legal determination that because
of a person's conduct that person, regardless of his true biological status,
will not be permitted to deny parentage, nor ... sue a third party for
support." 13 1  The legal analysis that occurs during a challenge to the
paternity of a child born during wedlock has two parts: "[F]irst, one
considers whether the presumption of paternity applies to a particular
case. If it does, one then considers whether the presumption has been
rebutted by one of the traditional methods. Second, if the presumption
has been rebutted or is inapplicable, one then questions whether estoppel
applies."'
' 32
In determining whether a party is estopped from challenging a
child's paternity, the court will examine whether the party has treated the
child as his or her own.' 33 Generally, to act as treating a child as one's
own includes holding the child out as one's own and supporting the
child.'
3 4
The application of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel does have a
small amount of flexibility, which plays an important role in situations
such as that presented in Miscovich.135 As reasoned by the Pennsylvania
Superior Court in Sekol, a party challenging a child's paternity or seeking
to establish a child's paternity may not be estopped if fraud or
misrepresentation is involved.1
36
As discussed above, Gerald Miscovich was deceived into believing
he was the father of his ex-wife's child.1 37 Further, Gerald no longer
held the child out as his own once he discovered he was not the
biological father.' 38 Although it is not certain based upon earlier cases, it
seems as if the court had refused to apply the presumption of paternity,
Gerald would not have been estopped from challenging his child's
paternity because 1) he no longer held the child out as his own; and
2) his wife had committed fraud.
Further, as demonstrated by a very recent Pennsylvania Superior
131. Id. at 180, n.5 (citing Freedman v. McCandless, 654 A.2d 529 (Pa. 1995)).
132. Id.
133. Id. at410.
134. Id. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reasoned that "[e]stoppel is based on the
public policy that children should be secure in knowing who their parents are. If a certain
person has acted as the parent and bonded with the child, the child should not be required
to suffer the potentially damaging trauma that may come from being told that the father
he has known all his life is not his father." Id.
135. See, e.g., Sekol v. Delsantro, 763 A.2d 351, 405 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2000)
(discussing the need for the trial court to consider any issues of fraud or
misrepresentation); Kohler v. Bleem, 654 A.2d 569 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (noting that the
trial court must consider allegations of fraud or misrepresentation).
136. Sekol, 763 A.2d at 410-11.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 74-84.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 74-84.
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Court decision, a defrauded father was not estopped from challenging the
paternity of a child conceived during his marriage to the child's
mother.' 39 In Doran v. Doran, the child at issue was born during the
marriage of the two litigating parties.140  The parties subsequently
divorced, and the ex-husband entered into an agreement with his ex-wife
for the payment of child support for the son. 141
When the child was approximately six-years old, the ex-husband
suspected that he was not the child's biological father. 142 After being
reassured by the ex-wife that he was the biological father, he continued
to pay child support and treat the child as his own. 143 A few years later,
the ex-husband again became suspicious of the child's paternity, and
DNA testing was performed to determine the child's paternity. 44 The
tests demonstrated that there was a zero percent probability that the ex-
husband was the child's father. 1
45
The ex-husband asked the court to relieve him of his support
obligation. 46 The trial court granted the ex-husband's motion, but the
ex-wife appealed. 47 The child's mother argued that her ex-husband was
barred from challenging the paternity of the child because the
presumption of paternity applied. 48  She further argued that if the
presumption of paternity did not apply, the father was estopped from
challenging the child's paternity. 1
49
The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the presumption of
paternity was inapplicable because, as demonstrated by Fish v. Behers,
there was no longer an intact family and, therefore, the policy underlying
the presumption of paternity would not be met.' 50 The court further held
that the ex-hsuband was not estopped from challenging the child's
paternity because his ex-wife had committed fraud; hence the ex-
husband "would not have held the child out as his own had it not been
for [his ex-wife's] fraudulent conduct."' 15'
139. Doran v. Doran, 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).





145. Doran, 820 A.2d at 1281.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1282.
149. Id.
150. Id. (citing Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721, 723 (Pa. 1999)).
151. Id. at 1284.
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E. The Legislature's Attempts To Regulate the Presumption of
Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel
In 1999, the Pennsylvania legislature looked at several bills that
would allow an individual challenging the paternity of a child two
additional methods of rebutting the presumption of paternity. 52
Representative Rod Wilt sponsored the bill. 5 3 The proposed legislation
stated that "the General Assembly finds that the common law rule
followed by the Pennsylvania courts relating to the presumption of
paternity for a child born during marriage is an ancient concept that fails
to conform with modern-day realities and current scientific methods of
determining parentage., 154 The Pennsylvania Bar Association publicly
opposed the proposed legislation. 
155
The bill directed that the presumption of paternity applied when the
married parties were cohabitating at the time of the child's birth.
156
Additionally, the proposed legislation would have allowed two other
methods for rebutting the presumption of paternity: (1) if the wife was
152. H.R. 521, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999); H.R. 522, 185th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999); H.R. 523, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999); S.
516, 184th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999). For purposes of this Comment,
discussion will focus on H.R. 521.
153. Pa.H.R. 521.
154. Id.
155. Ned Mark & Howard M. Goldsmith, Report of the Taskforce Appointed by
Family Law Section Chair, James Mahood and Chair-Elect, Mary Cushing Doherty To
Review Pending Legislation, 1999 P.B.A. SEC. FAM. L., at 14-26.
156. Pa. H.R. 521. The text of the proposed bill included the following:
§ 5102.1. Paternity of child born during marriage.
(a) Presumption of paternity. A child born during a marriage is presumed
to be the child of the marriage and the issue of the husband.
(b) Rebuttable presumption. The husband or wife may rebut the
presumption of paternity by a showing of any of the following:
(1) the husband did not have access to the wife at the time of
conception;
(2) the husband was physically incapable of procreation at the time of
conception;
(3) the wife engaged in an extra-marital affair at the time of
conception; or
(4) the husband voluntarily completed a blood test which determines
that the husband could not be the father of the child.
(c) Applicability of the presumption. The presumption of paternity in
subsection (a) shall apply in instances where the husband and wife
cohabitated at the time of the birth of the child.
(d) Estoppel of paternity actions. Notwithstanding subsection (b), an
action for paternity shall become irrebuttable if there is clear and
convincing evidence that the husband openly holds out the child to be his
and receives the child into his home for a period of two or more years after
the birth of the child.
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engaged in an extramarital relationship at the time of conception, or (2) if
the husband voluntarily completed a blood test that determined that the
husband could not be the father of the child.'57 The bill was a legislative
reaction to the recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Miscovich
v. Miscovich. 5 8  In the Pennsylvania Senate, the bill died in the Rules
and Executive Nominations Committee. 59 In the Pennsylvania House of
Representatives, the bill died in the House Judiciary Committee. 1
60
In 2001, the Pennsylvania legislature again became involved in the
debate. 16' The 2001 proposed bill would have amended the current
Pennsylvania statute governing how blood tests may be used to
determine paternity. 162 Senator O'Pake introduced a bill addressing the
157. Id.
158. Rodier, supra note 76, at 1, 27.
159. On The Hill, PA. LAW., Mar.-Apr. 2001, at 57.
160. Telephone interview with Kathy Reighter, Administrative Secretary,
Pennsylvania State Legislature House of Representative Judiciary Committee (Jan. 16,
2003) (discussing the process by which a proposed bill dies when the session closes and
the bill was never acted upon).
161. S. 802, 184th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001); H.R. 2701, 185th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2001). For purposes of this Comment, discussion will focus on
H.R. 2701.
162. Pa. H.R. 2701. The proposed bill sought to amend the current legislation.
Importantly, the bill would have eliminated subsection g of the current statute, which
reads: "The presumption of legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the
court finds the conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the
tests show that the husband is not the father of the child." 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5104
(2002). The bill would add subsection (h):
(h) Effect on Presumption of Paternity. The presumption of paternity of a child
born during wedlock as recognized prior to the effective date of this subsection
in this Commonwealth is reaffirmed and made subject to the following
provisions:
(1) Upon petition for testing in an action in which paternity of a child is an
issue filed not later than five years after the child's birth, the court shall
permit testing to rebut the presumption of paternity provided that the
overall interest of justice, including the best interests of the child, would
not be unreasonably harmed and:
(i) the parties subject to the presumption are divorced or
irreconcilably separated, and one or both assert reasonable grounds to
believe that application of the presumption is likely to result in an
incorrect paternity determination;
(ii) the parties subject to the presumption mutually agree to submit
and be bound to the testing; or
(iii) if either party subject to the presumption has voluntarily
submitted to testing or permitted the child to be subject to testing,
including prenatal testing, the court may allow the test results to be
reviewed by experts and the experts' conclusions to be reported to the
court or order the parties to submit to testing pursuant to subsection
(c).
(2) No party who requests testing under this section shall be required to
show clear and convincing evidence of the husband's inability to procreate
or lack of access to the mother.
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determination of paternity in April 2001, and the bill was sent to the
Senate Judiciary Committee.163 A large number of State Representatives
introduced the same bill in the House of Representatives in June 2002,
and the bill was sent to the House Judiciary Committee.'
64
The House Judiciary Committee met to debate the proposed
legislation in mid-September.' 65  During the meeting, the Children's
Rights Committee expressed their concerns for the well being of the
children who will be affected directly if the law is changed in the
proposed manner. 166 The bill died at the end of the 2002 session, but
there are plans to reintroduce the bill when the assembly session begins
in 2003.167
IV. The Futility of the Legislative Attempts at Redefining the
Presumption of Paternity and Paternity by Estoppel: The
Pennsylvania Courts Answered Equity's Call
The problems associated with the presumption of paternity and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court's refusal to allow the use of blood or DNA
evidence were numerous. The doctrine of the presumption of paternity
and the doctrine of paternity by estoppel created forced parenthood.
168
Further, the application of the presumption of paternity was
unpredictable.1 69 Yet, as demonstrated by the most recent string of
Pennsylvania Superior Court cases, the most egregious inequities
associated with the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel
(3) A party requesting testing under this section shall be required to bear
all testing and court costs if the court finds that the conclusions of all the
experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the tests show that the
husband is the father of the child.
(4) The presumption of paternity is overcome if the court finds that the
conclusions of all the experts as disclosed by the evidence based upon the
tests show that the husband is not the father of the child.
(5) The principle of paternity by estoppel shall not be applied where
testing is sought under this section and the court finds that not applying
the principle of paternity by estoppel is in the best interests of the child.
Pa. H.R. 2701.
163. Pa. S. 802.
164. Pa.H.R.2701.
165. Telephone Interview with Karen Daulton, Staff Member, Pennsylvania House of
Representatives Judiciary Committee (Nov. 20, 2002).
166. Id.
167. Telephone interview with Bill Casey, Counsel to Pennsylvania Senator O'Pake
(Jan. 16, 2003).
168. See Miscovich v. Miscovich, 688 A.2d 726 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding ex-
husband, although not biological father, legally the father due to application of the
presumption of paternity); see also Fish v. Behers, 741 A.2d 721 (Pa. 1999) (applying the
doctrine of paternity by estoppel, after the presumption of paternity was deemed
inapplicable, to hold a ex-husband to be legally responsible for a child he did not father).
169. See supra Part III.B.
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have been remedied.17
0
A. Forced Fatherhood: How the Presumption of Paternity and the
Doctrine ofPaternity by Estoppel Created Parenthood Where It Did
Not Exist
Prior to Fish v. Behers, the presumption of paternity had the ability
to affect the lives of married couples in a negative way: it was possible
for unsuspecting husbands to become legally responsible for the children
of their adulterous wives. The most illustrative decision of forced
fatherhood is the case of Miscovich v. Miscovich, in which an ex-
husband was held to be the legal father of his adulterous and
misrepresenting wife's child. 171
Therefore, in Miscovich, an adulterous wife deceived her husband
into fatherhood, and the courts would not relieve him of that
obligation. 72 A father, who was not the biological father of the child
born during his former marriage, was held liable for financially
supporting the child. Moreover, the trial and superior courts' application
of the presumption of paternity was contrary to the policies underlying
the presumption of paternity.1 73 As stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court, the presumption of paternity should only be applied when the
underlying purpose, preservation of the marriage, is served. 74 Because
the parties had divorced, the application of the presumption of paternity
served only to force Gerald Miscovich into fatherhood of the child of his
adulterous wife.
After the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated in Fish that the
presumption of paternity would not apply when the parties were no
longer married, a semblance of predictability and consistency emerged in
the courts. 175 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Fish v.
Behers clarified the application of the presumption of paternity and
170. The courts are now applying the presumption of paternity in the manner outlined
in Fish v. Behers. For example, most recently, in Doran v. Doran, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that the presumption of paternity did not apply when the parties to
the action were divorced. 820 A.2d 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003). The court followed the
lead of Fish v. Behers and directly cited the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's language that
"[the policy underlying the presumption of the paternity is the preservation of marriages
... it only applies in cases where that policy would be advanced by the application." Id.
Further, in J.C. v. JS., the Pennsylvania Superior Court also followed the lead of Fish
and held that the presumption of paternity was not applicable to the case because the
parties were no longer married. 826 A.2d 1 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
171. 688 A.2d at 726.
172. Id.
173. See Brinkley v. King, 701 A.2d 176, 180-81 (Pa. 1997) (stating that the policy
underlying the presumption of paternity is the preservation of the marriage).
174. Id. at 181.
175. See, e.g., Doran, 820 A.2dat 1279;J.C., 826 A.2dat 1.
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allowed it to function in a more equitable manner. 176
B. The Superior Court Recognizes That the Doctrine of Paternity by
Estoppel Should Not Operate To Force Fatherhood on Misled Ex-
Husbands
Prior to the Doran decision in 2003, even if the presumption of
paternity was not applied, the doctrine of paternity by estoppel was
applied in an unpredictable fashion. Because in most situations where a
wife has misrepresented to her husband that the child born during their
marriage is his, it can be assumed that he would treat the child as his
own. Therefore, the husband's responsible actions would lead to a legal
responsibility he may not have been seeking.
1 77
C. The Possible Impact of the Proposed Legislation
1. The 1999 Bill
In the 1999 legislative session, Representative Rod Wilt, in
conjunction with various co-sponsors, proposed a bill that would have
allowed additional methods to rebut the presumption of paternity and
defined the situation in which the presumption of paternity is
applicable. 
178
The legislation stated that "the presumption of paternity in
subsection (a) shall apply in instances where the husband and wife
cohabitated at the time of the birth."' 179 By directing the application of
the presumption of paternity, the proposed legislation would have
resolved the conflicts demonstrated by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
decisions in 1998 and 1999.180 In contrast with the current state of the
law,' 81 the bill would allow parties to rebut the presumption of paternity
with blood evidence.
1 82
176. See supra note 170.
177. See supra text accompanying notes 126-51 (discussing what a husband would
have done to apply the doctrine of paternity by estoppel).
178. H.R. 521, 185th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 1999); see also supra note 150
(giving text of proposed legislation).
179. Pa. H.R. 521; see also supra note 150 (giving text of proposed legislation).
180. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 72-101 (giving an example of
conflicting opinions from two superior courts).
181. See supra text accompanying notes 59-71 (discussing Pennsylvania Supreme
Court's lead ruling on the admissibility of blood evidence to rebut the presumption of
paternity).
182. Pa. H.R. 521. The proposed bill named four methods by which a party could
rebut the presumption of paternity: (1) by proving the husband did not have access to the
wife at the time of conception; (2) by proving the husband was physically incapable of
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The legislation also directed the application of the doctrine of
paternity by estoppel. 183 The proposed bill would only estop parties from
challenging the paternity of their child if "there is clear and convincing
evidence that the husband openly holds out the child as his and receives
the child into his home for a period of two years or more years after birth
of the child."'
18 4
Although the bill limited the allotted time period in which the party
may rebut the presumption of paternity using blood evidence, 185 or one of
the other methods listed, to two years, the legislation would have
afforded defrauded fathers a better opportunity for rebuttal than the
current state of the law.
2. The 2001-2002 Bill
The Pennsylvania General Assembly again considered legislation
addressing the doctrines of the presumption of paternity and paternity by
estoppel in the 2001-2002 regular session.1 86  The bill would have
allowed parties to overcome the presumption of paternity with blood
evidence under certain circumstances similar to those proposed in the
1999 bill. 187 The proposed amendment would have: (1) allowed a party
to use blood evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity if the action
to challenge the paternity is filed no later than five years after the child's
birth and the "overall interests of justice, including the best interests of
the child, would not be harmed;" and (2) one of three additional criteria
were met.' 
88
The proposed bill would have opened the door for deceived fathers
procreation at the time of conception; (3) by proving the wife was engaged in an
extramarital affair at the time of conception; and (4) the husband voluntarily completed a




186. H.R. 2701, 186th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess (2002) (the legislation sought to
amend Section 5104 of Title 23 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes).
187. Id.
188. Pa. H.R. 2701. The relevant test reads:
(i) the parties subject to the presumption are divorced or irreconcilably
separated, and one or both assert reasonable grounds to believe that application
of the presumption is likely to result in an incorrect paternity determination;
(ii) the parties subject to the presumption mutually agree to submit to and be
bound by the testing; or
(iii) if either party subject to the presumption has voluntarily submitted to
testing or permitted the child to be subject to testing, including prenatal testing,
the court may allow the test results to be reviewed by experts and the experts'
conclusions reported to the court or the parties to submit to testing pursuant to
subsection(c).
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to escape the forced fatherhood created by their adulterous wives.
Although the husband would have to challenge the child's paternity
within five years of the child's birth and ensure that justice would not be
harmed by the paternity challenge, at minimum it would have given
defrauded husbands an opportunity to challenge the paternity of the
child.
The bill considered in 2001-2002 gave some direction to the courts'
application of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel.' 89 The bill did not
advocate strict application of the doctrine of paternity by estoppel; rather,
the bill states that the principle should be applied only when testing was
not sought under Section 5104 and the court has found the application
would be in the best interests of the child.' 90
The clause concerning the doctrine of paternity by estoppel would
have lessened the courts' general standard of application and allowed the
interests of the child to become a relevant factor in the paternity
determination. This addition would have focused a court's analysis on
the facts of an individual situation. Such a focus would have led to more
equitable results because the actual interests of the child would be
considered. Therefore, even if application of paternity by estoppel
appeared warranted, it may have been avoided if the family situation was
such that a child may benefit from knowing his or her biological father.
3. The Current Bill Proposal
After the bill proposed in the 2001-2002 session died, new bills
concerning blood and DNA evidence and paternity were introduced in
the Pennsylvania legislature.' 9' The bills proposed in the 2003 session
would have little or no effect on the current state of the law of the
doctrines of the presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel.
There are currently three proposed bills floating around the House and
Senate. 192 In contrast to past bills, the present bills propose only that
blood and/or DNA evidence be allowed to rebut the presumption of
paternity and only in limited circumstances. 93 The bills do not include
any provisions that would direct the application of the presumption of
paternity or paternity by estoppel. Therefore, technically, the proposed
bills would allow blood or DNA evidence to rebut the presumption of
paternity, but there would be no practical impact of the proposed bills.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. S. 108, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); H.R. 1655, 187th Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003); H.R. 1562, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003).
192. Pa. S. 108; Pa. H.R. 1655; Pa. H.R. 1562.
193. Pa. S. 108; Pa. H.R. 1655; Pa. H.R. 1562.
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The current bill proposals would have little or no practical impact
because of the recent developments in the law, as set forth by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Prior to 1999 and the decision in Fish v.
Behers, the courts did not have clear direction as to the proper
application of the presumption of paternity. The courts, as demonstrated
in Miscovich and Amhrien, had the power to trap deceived ex-husbands
using the presumption of paternity.194 Yet, when Fish was decided, the
court no longer could use the presumption of paternity to force
fatherhood upon ex-husbands because the presumption did not apply if
the parties were separated or divorced.1 95  Therefore, it is now
unimportant if blood or DNA evidence can be used to rebut the
presumption of paternity. It is unlikely that an intact family would ever
challenge the paternity of a member of the family, and because the
presumption of paternity only applies to intact families, further methods
of rebuttal are really not needed.
The purpose of this Comment was to address the most egregious of
inequities resulting from the application of the presumption of paternity
and paternity by estoppel. This is the forcing of fatherhood upon ex-
husbands who had been tricked into taking responsibility for their
adulterous wives' children. The inequity to the ex-husbands in those
situations outweighs the interest in ensuring that a child knows the
identity of his or her parents. Yet, when Fish v. Behers was decided in
1999, the law no longer applied the presumption of paternity to situations
in which the family was no longer intact. This prevented the court from
imposing fatherhood upon an ex-husband who left his wife because he
found out about her adultery and subsequent deceit regarding the
paternity of the child.
V. Conclusion
The presumption of paternity and paternity by estoppel are legal
fictions. They create legal parenthood when biological parenthood can
be proven. Yet, the doctrines serve a useful purpose in society: they
ensure that a child knows who his or her parents are.
However, there was a time when the injustice served upon a legally
determined father outweighed the injustice that would be served upon the
child. During the late 1990s, as demonstrated by Miscovich and
Amhrien, the Pennsylvania courts allowed adulterous and dishonest
mothers to impose legal responsibility upon their innocent, although not
necessarily honorable, ex-husbands.
The practical outcomes of Miscovich and Amhrein formed the basis
194. See supra notes 9, 75-100 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 104-125 and accompanying text.
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for most of the public outcry against the presumption of paternity and
paternity by estoppel. The cases demonstrated the worst of an unpopular
doctrine. Demands for either the abolishment of the doctrines or the use
of blood and DNA evidence to rebut the presumption of paternity
abound.
Yet, although the legislature made several unsuccessful attempts to
reform the doctrines of the presumption of paternity and paternity by
estoppel, it was the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that ultimately, and
quietly, came up with what appears the most workable solution to an
age-old problem. The court's decision in Fish v. Behers clarified the
proper application of the presumption of paternity and prevents it from
being used in further cases to legally bind deceived ex-husbands in an
egregiously inequitable manner.

